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**The plan’s appeasement.**

**Stern 6** (Martin, University of Maryland Graduate, Debunking detente, 11/27/06, http://www.diamondbackonline.com/article\_56223e79-7009-56a3-8afe-5d08bfff6e08.html)

Appeasement is defined as "granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace." Giving Iran international legitimacy and removing sanctions would have maintained peace with a potential enemy without changing the undemocratic practices of the enemy. If this isn't appeasement, I don't know how better to define the word.

**That’s not topical – economic engagement is the establishment of economic contacts – not one time appeasement.**

**Resnick 01** – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND APPEASEMENT

In contrast to many prevailing conceptions of engagement, the one proposed in this essay allows a **substantive distinction** to be drawn between **engagement** and **appeasement**. The standard definition of appeasement--which derives from the language of classical European diplomacy, namely "a policy of attempting to reduce tension between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between them"(n29)--is venerable but nevertheless inadequate.(n30) It does not provide much guidance to the contemporary policymaker or policy analyst, because it conceives of a foreign policy approach in terms of the **ends** sought while never **making clear** the **precise means** involved. The principal causes of conflict between two states can be removed in a **number of ways**.(n31)

A more refined definition of appeasement that not only remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a **firm conceptual distinction from engagement** might be: the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US-acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine-permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border between Alaska and the Yukon--consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority.(n32) Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938); acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).(n33) A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again off-again diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority.

Thus, a **rigid conceptual distinction** can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, **engagement differs from appeasement** by establishing an **increasingly interdependent relationship** between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) **Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts** or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

**Embargo limits drilling now – plan unlocks large-scale Cuban production.**

**Padgett ‘8** Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami & Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, “How Cuba’s Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo”¶ Time Magazine – Oct. 23, 2008 – internally quoting Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil analyst at the University of Nebraska-Omaha.

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,¶ 1853252,00.html#ixzz13Li5cosN

The Spanish energy company Repsol-YPF has entered into a production-sharing agreement with Cupet and is scheduled to start drilling the first real well in the EEZ next year. Other international firms, including Norway's StatoilHidro and India's Oil & Natural Gas Corp., are part of the Repsol-led consortium. Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela is considered a lesser player because it has little deep-water drilling experience. (China is also interested but so far only involved in onshore drilling in Cuba.) Cuba is now in important negotiations with Brazil's Petrobras, which just made its own multibillion-barrel oil find off its coast near Rio de Janeiro and could, analysts say, be the major offshore drilling partner for Cuba if it jumps in.¶ Still, the concessions so far represent **less than a quarter** of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason is the daunting infrastructural difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring much more of their own capital, equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This year's severe hurricane damage in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block contract. "Who else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says Benjamin-Alvarado. "In terms of proximity and technology, **the only people** really **able to** do it to the extent the Cubans need **are the Americans."**

**That trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties.**

**Alhaiji and Maris ‘4**

[Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that¶ energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a¶ market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition”¶ refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily¶ mean regime change.¶ The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of **massive**¶ **oil deposits** in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic,¶ and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region.¶ The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on¶ one hand and US energy policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba¶ relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could affect the¶ energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between¶ the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

**That causes Saudi Prolif.**

**Guzansky ’13** Yoel Guzansky is a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University. His main research area is Gulf security. He has also served as Iran coordinator at Israel's National Security Council. His recent publications include The Gulf States in a Changing Strategic Environment (2012), One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications, and The Gulf States: Between Iran and the West – Middle East Quarterly¶ Spring 2013, pp. 59-64 – available at: http://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon

Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, Iraq's increasing alignment with Tehran, and an expedited U.S. exit from Afghanistan are all changing the Saudi strategic landscape. The Obama administration's "lead from behind" approach in Libya and its hesitation to get involved in the Syrian civil war all contribute to a reassessment of U.S. commitments. With the U.S. "pivot to Asia"—taking the form of a series of military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China—and a changing global energy map due to expansion of oil and natural gas production in the United States, Riyadh and others are beginning to prepare for a post-U.S. Middle East.¶ According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its nuclear cooperation with Riyadh on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance.[33] Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran's nuclear policy. The United States is still Saudi Arabia's most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable.¶ The question of Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown on Washington's part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh's inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on **the quality of relations between the two countries** and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally. Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret previously.¶ After Iran, Saudi Arabia is the **number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation** in the Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option.¶ The kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran's dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh's **doubts about the reliability of Washington** is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural candidate for such an arrangement.¶ Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, **at present**, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. **But strategic interest**, motivated by considerations of survival, **could have the upper hand**. Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

**Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.**

**Edelman ’11** (Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among **three** or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering **a regional nuclear war**. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

**Text: The United States federal government should allow normal trade between the United States and Cuba if and only if the governments of a majority of Latin American nations commit to:**

**--actively seeking a normalization process between the United States and Cuba, and**

**--compelling the Cuban government to work towards establishing representative democracy and better respect for human rights.**

**Counterplan solves the case—Latin American governments will say yes—it triggers sustainable Cuban reform**

**Castañeda 9** - Jorge G. Castañeda, professor at New York University and fellow at the New America Foundation, was Mexico’s foreign minister from 2000 to 2003, April 21, 2009, Wall Street Journal, "The Right Deal on Cuba," proquest)

The question of what to do about the embargo has once again cornered an American president. If President Barack Obama lifts the embargo unilaterally, he will send a message to the Castros and the rest of Latin America that human rights and democracy are not his bailiwick. Furthermore, he lacks the votes in the Senate to do so, unless he obtains an explicit Cuban quid pro quo, which Raul Castro cannot grant him, especially with his brother back in charge.

Conversely, if Mr. Obama limits change to the recently announced freer flow of remittances and family visits to the island, Democrats in the House, Latin American leaders, and the Castros will remain unsatisfied. And if he insists on political change as a precondition for lifting the embargo, Mr. Obama would be pursuing the policy that his last 10 predecessors have fruitlessly followed.

There might be a way to square the circle. It begins with a unilateral end to the embargo: Nothing is expected from Cuba. But in exchange for eliminating the embargo, key Latin American players would be expected to commit to actively seeking a normalization process between Washington and Havana, and to forcing Cuba to establish representative democracy and respect for human rights.

As democrats who experienced authoritarian rule and sought international support in their struggle against it, leaders like Brazilian President Lula da Silva, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, and Mexican President Felipe Calderon have been incredibly cynical and irresponsible about Cuba. Mr. Calderon and Ms. Bachelet have forsaken their commitment to democracy and human rights in order to accommodate the left wing. Mr. da Silva, despite having been jailed by the military dictatorship in the early 1980s, has pursued the traditional Brazilian policy of avoiding controversy. By nudging the Latin leaders toward a principled stance, Mr. Obama would turn the tables.

This policy would give the Cubans what they say they want: an unconditional end to the embargo, the beginning of a negotiation process, and perhaps even access to international financial institutions' funds. The Latin American leaders would get a major concession from the new administration on a highly symbolic issue. And human-rights defenders in Latin America and elsewhere would see their concerns regarding free elections, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and the liberation of political prisoners addressed as a demand from Cuba's friends -- not as an imposition from Washington.

Mr. Obama would look great, since U.S. policy would shift in exchange for Latin leaders' dedication to principles like democracy and human rights that he and they espouse. A clear commitment from Latin leaders to a normalization that would not follow the Vietnamese course (economic reform with no political change) would be a major foreign policy victory for Mr. Obama.

**Unilaterally cooperating with Cuba destroys the credibility of all Latin American democracy—causes authoritarian backsliding**

**Castañeda 8** - Jorge G. Castañeda, professor at New York University and fellow at the New America Foundation, was Mexico~’s foreign minister from 2000 to 2003, September-October 2008, "Morning in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5, proquest)

Realpolitik and fear of another exodus of Cuban refugees across the Straits of Florida may tempt Washington to pursue a "Chinese," or "Vietnamese," solution to the relationship with Cuba: that is, normalizing diplomatic relations in exchange for economic reforms while leaving the question of internal political change until much later. It should not do this, chiefly because of the regional implications. Over the past few decades, the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Latin America have patiently constructed a regional legal framework to defend and encourage democratic rule as well as respect for human rights in the hemisphere. These values have been enshrined in conventions, charters, and free trade-agreements, from the InterAmerican Democratic Charter, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the American Convention on Human Rights and the labor and environmental chapters of free-trade agreements, as well as in the democratic clauses of the economic agreements between Chile and the EU and between Mexico and the EU. These mechanisms are not perfect, and they have not truly been tested. But to waive them in the interests of simply guaranteeing stability in Cuba and ensuring an exodus-free succession instead of a democratic transition-that is, creating once again a "Cuban exception" for reasons of pure pragmatism-would be unworthy of the enormous efforts every country in the hemisphere has made to deepen and strengthen democracy in the Americas. Cuba must return to the regional concert of powers, but accepting this concert s rules. To allow it to proceed otherwise would weaken democracy and encourage authoritarian traditions in the hemisphere-and lay the groundwork for other exceptions that would justify their existence by invoking the Cuban precedent.

**Latin American democracy’s a key model for democracy globally**

**Fauriol and Weintraub 95** – \*director of the CSIS Americas program and \*\*Prof of Public Affairs at the University of Texas Georges and Sidney, The Washington Quarterly, "U.S. Policy, Brazil, and the Southern Cone", Lexis

The democracy theme also carries much force in the hemisphere today. The State Department regularly parades the fact that all countries in the hemisphere, save one, now have democratically elected governments. True enough, as long as the definition of democracy is flexible, but these countries turned to democracy mostly of their own volition. It is hard to determine if the United States is using the democracy theme as a club in the hemisphere (hold elections or be excluded) or promoting it as a goal. If as a club, its efficacy is limited to this hemisphere, as the 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Indonesia demonstrated in its call for free trade in that region, replete with nondemocratic nations, by 2020. Following that meeting, Latin Americans are somewhat cynical as to whether the United States really cares deeply about promoting democracy if this conflicts with expanding exports. Yet this triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by the United States, but with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will **compromise progress elsewhere in the world**.

**Extinction**

**Diamond 1995** - Hoover Institute Senior Fellow (Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The **very source of life on Earth**, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. **Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy**, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

#### Text: Bureaucrats, politicians and military personnel who think that they have their hands on the levers of American power should phase out a substantial portion of their economic restrictions toward Cuba.

#### CPs key to agency -- plan kills it.

**Mann, 97** (Frederick, <http://www.mind-trek.com/reports/tl07e.htm>, NG)

You might think, "So what? Why is this important?" Much of the time, it isn't. When the referent is a thing, a physical object, the distinction isn't important. But what happens when we use a word like "government?" What is the referent? The word "government" is generally used as a singular noun describing a creature that sounds like a human only much more powerful. Here are some examples from earlier articles: "Certainly the government is concerned only for itself and it's kin (politicians). Certainly the government will kill or imprison me if this is perceived to be in its interest. Certainly the government has the power to do so." ... "It may be very difficult for individual humans to be aware of the thought processes of governments..." and "Communicating with a government is not easy at all." You can easily find other examples in the newspaper or just listening to people talk, of the word "government" being used as if it refers to a single volitional entity. Who or what then, is this beast called "government?" Have you seen it? Have you spoken with it? Do you know any one who has? Even though the word "government" is often used as if the referent is a single being, it's obvious that it isn't. So what then does the word "government" refer to? Maybe nothing. No thing. Maybe there is no such THING as "government." At first, this may seem like a trivial distinction. After all, there are still policemen, judges, congressmen, IRS agents and other assorted terrocrats. Yes, there are people who call themselves "government." Some of them are very dangerous and all of them want to interfere with the lives of others. But thinking of "government" as an ill-defined, all-powerful foe, puts you in the position of a victim. How can anyone stand up to such a "government" as that? I certainly couldn't. This is a scary creature. But if I cross paths with a terrocrat or two, I can handle that. Terrocrats are human, with no magical powers. I can arrange my life to avoid or minimize contact with them. I can't defend myself against a mythical "government" beast. Terrocrats are human. I can deal with them.

**Extinction**

**Beres, 94–** Ph.D., Professor of International Law, Purdue University (Louis Rene, “Self-Determination, International Law and Survival on Planet Earth”, NG)

With Hegel's characterization of the State as "the march of God in the world," John Locke's notion of a Social Contract -- the notion upon which the United States was founded n66 -- is fully disposed of, relegated to the ash heap of history. While the purpose of the State, for Locke, is to provide protection that is otherwise unavailable to individuals -- the "preservation of their lives, liberties and States" -- for Hegel, the State stands above any private interests. It is the spirit of the State, Volksgeist, rather than of individuals, that is the presumed creator of advanced civilization. And it is in war, rather than in peace, that a State is judged to demonstrate its true worth and potential. [\*22] How easily humankind still gives itself to the new gods. Promised relief from the most terrifying of possibilities -- death and disappearance -- our species regularly surrenders itself to formal structures of power and immunity. Ironically, such surrender brings about an enlargement of the very terrors that created the new gods in the first place, but we surrender nonetheless. In the words of William Reich, we lay waste to ourselves by embracing the "political plague-mongers," a necrophilous partnership that promises purity and vitality through the killing of "outsiders." This, then, is an altogether different kind of understanding. Rather than rescue humankind by freeing individuals from fear of death, this perspective recommends educating people to the truth of an incontestable relationship between death and geopolitics. By surrendering ourselves to States and to traditional views of self-determination, we encourage not immortality but premature and predictable extinction. It is a relationship that can, and must, be more widely understood. There are great ironies involved. Although the corrosive calculus of geopolitics has now made possible the deliberate killing of all life, populations all over the planet turn increasingly to States for security. It is the dreadful ingenuity of States that makes possible death in the billions, but it is in the expressions of that ingenuity that people seek safety. Indeed, as the threat of nuclear annihilation looms even after the Cold War, n71 the citizens of conflicting States

**Multilat fails and is unsustainable.**

**Young et al 13** Kevin Young is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, David Held is Master of University College, and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham. He is also Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy, Thomas Hale is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, Open Democracy, May 24, 2013, "Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation", http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation

\*We do not endorse the ableist language.

The Doha round of trade negotiations is **deadlocked**, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met **for two decades without** finding **a way to stem** global **emissions. The UN is ~~paralyzed~~** in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. **Global coop**eration **is gridlocked** across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are **not the result of any single** underlying causal **structure**, but rather of **several** underlying **dynamics** that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems – indeed it is – but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that **have overwhelmed** the **problem-solving capacities** of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of ‘governed globalization’ that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of institutional arrangements have emerged alongside formal intergovernmental bodies, including a variety of types of transnational governance arrangements such as networks of government officials, public-private partnerships, as well as exclusively private/corporate bodies. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O’Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet **the “supply”** side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, **has stalled.** In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, **multilateral** and transnational **coop**eration **is** now increasingly **ineffective** or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify **four reasons** for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising **multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation**. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below.

**Growing multipolarity**.

The absolute number of states has **increased by 300 percent** in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that “matter” on a given issue—that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed—has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many **more countries, represent**ing a **diverse** range of **interests, must agree** in order for global cooperation to occur.

**Institutional inertia**.

The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And **yet, the architects of the postwar order did not**, in most cases, **design institutions that would** organically **adjust to fluctuations in** national **power**.

**Harder problems**.

As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. **Problems are both now more extensive**, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, **and intensive**, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards—about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, **the divergence of** voice and **interest** within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have **made a global deal**, thus far, **impossible** (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011).

**Fragmentation**.

The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential **rise in** both multilateral and transnational **organizations** has **creat**ed a more **complex** multilevel and multi-actor system of **global governance.** Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. **Fragmented institutions**, in turn, **disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs.** In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The **challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced** by the 1945 victors **in the postwar settlement**. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level.

**Engagement with Cuba wrecks US credibility.**

**Rubin ‘11 -** Labor Law Attorney and Washington Post Journalist, quotes the chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, quotes a report by the Associated Press, quotes the former deputy national security advisor, (Jennifer, August 18, 2011, “Obama’s Cuba appeasement”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL\_blog.html )//HH

The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: “According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didn’t try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. **Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them.** We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants.”

As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didn’t stop there. The [Associated Press](http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-14/cuba-imprisoned-american-swap/50767012/1?csp=34news)reported, “The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross’ release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States.”

Former deputy national security adviser [Elliott Abrams explained](http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2011/10/14/trading-away-cuba-policy/#more-2032), “It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime.”

The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same.

Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. **There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States.**

Whether it is Cuba or [Iran,](http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/280214/iran-dangerous-and-diplomacy-has-failed-jamie-m-fly) the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.

**Single issues aren’t key to cred.**

**Lake, 10–** Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego (David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//DR. H

President Obama and his administration appear to recognize the need to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the United States in the world. But virtue alone cannot provide credible guarantees against future US opportunism. Unipolarity is an enabling condition that persists. **The problem of credibility is structural, and not one that a new administration can solve simply by a new style or approach to foreign policy.** Ironically, to safeguard its authority requires that the United States embed its coercive capabilities even deeper into multilateral institutions that can provide real checks on potential opportunism.

**Plan kills Latin American relations.**

**Suchlicki 2k.** (Jaime, University of Miami, s Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History ¶ and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban ¶ and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. June “The U.S. Embargo of Cuba” http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf)

**Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations**. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, and transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. **Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda**. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.

**No Bio-D impact.**

**Sagoff, 97** - Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on **the brink of** an episode of **massive extinction, it may not follow** from this grim fact **that human** being**s will suffer** as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain **why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth**. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the **elimination of all but a tiny minority** **of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota."**n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "**The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct,** provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain **even if** **every threatened organism becomes extinct**. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, **one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes**. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, **the number of species has been increasing dramatically**, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, **biodiversity matters only up to a point**; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make **little difference**." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. **The most valuable things are quite useless**.

**No warming impacts.**

**Burnett, 12** – Sterling, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Environment and Energy at the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), “Fraud and Heartland: A Scandal for Climate Alarmists, not Skeptics,” 2-22, http://environmentblog.ncpa.org/fraud-and-heartland-a-scandal-for-climate-alarmists-not-skeptics/.

Sadly (for him), Peter Gleick, the researcher at issue, could have obtained a good deal of the information he sought through a request for Heartland’s 990, a tax document that non-profits have to provide to any who request it. Rather than going through legitimate channels to obtain what information he could or, better still, questioning the veracity of the initial document he received — and there were many reasons to question that document, among them the fact that it was delivered to him anonymously — using someone else’s name, a Heartland board member — he requested internal documents. Despite all the sound and fury surrounding this episode over the last week, really, nothing new was learned in the memos. As Time Magazine summed it up: “The alleged memos seem to confirm that the Heartland Institute is trying to push it’s highly skeptical view of climate science into the public sphere, which is only surprising if you’ve paid exactly zero attention to the climate debate over the past decade.” Gleick admits that his actions were wrong and apologized but said he did it out of “frustration.” One has to ask, frustration over what? Is he perhaps frustrated with the fact that he and his fellow climate alarmists have, as of yet, been unable to convince Americans that the scientific case for climate action is settled and stampede them into calling for policies that forcibly restrict energy use? Daily polls show more American’s are coming to doubt the argument that human actions are causing a warming that would result in catastrophic climate change. Or perhaps he is frustrated with the fact that an increasing number of scientists – scientists with **as good or better credentials** and reputations as those who argue that humans are causing warming — continue to highlight the weakness, discrepancies and contradictions that continue to plague global warming theory and demonstrate that the case in far from closed. Perhaps Glieck and his ilk are frustrated because they constantly bray that scientists and think tanks that show skepticism concerning one or another critical point of global warming theory are exceedingly well-funded; when the reality is, and Gleick knows it, these scientists and think tanks are **very modestly funded** when compared to the billions that are spent to on climate research, politics and on politically favored technologies by governments, billionaires and corporations who will benefit from climate policies, and the non-profit foundations and think tanks that want to use fear of global warming to reshape the Western economic system into what they believe would be a more humane, equitable (socialist), global version of society. A society where international bodies, with bureaucracies staffed by “experts” beyond the reach of crass democratic politics and mass opinion will steer the ship of global-state in the direction of the “true” public good. Time magazine notes that if anything, the Heartland memos debunk the idea of a well-funded “. . . vast right-wing conspiracy,” behind global warming skepticism. Who says the Progressive era has passed?

**No food wars, and they don’t escalate.**

**Salehyan 08** (Idean, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ North Texas, Journal of Peace Research, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet”, 45:3, Sage, DOI: 10.1177/0022343308088812)

A few caveats are in order here. It is important to note, again, that the most severe effects of climate change are likely to be felt in the future, and the future is inherently uncertain.4 While fundamental shifts in the environment are not inconceivable, our best bet for predicting what is to come is to look at what has transpired in the past. Since it is frequently argued that climate change will lead to resource scarcities and exacerbate inequality, it is possible to draw upon past evidence regarding these factors to develop a sense of how conflicts might unfold given changes in the Earth’s atmosphere. Additionally, I do not take issue with the claim that climate change will present considerable challenges for human societies and ecosystems more generally. Humanitarian crises stemming, in part, from climate change have the potential to be severe, and steps must be taken quickly to attenuate such contingencies. Rather, my purpose here is to underscore the point that environmental processes, by themselves, cannot explain why, where, and when fighting will occur; rather, the interaction between environmental and political systems is critical for understanding organized armed violence. First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when conflicts will break out. For every potential example of an environmental catastrophe or resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counter-examples in which conflict never occurs. But popular accounts typically do not look at the dogs that do not bark. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many countries – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – but similar problems elsewhere have not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food shortages and malnutrition affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6 although none of these countries have experienced fullblown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and droughts – which are all likely to intensify as the climate warms – are frequent occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004, although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property, flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most migration flows do not lead to conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007). In short, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental conditions, by themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. Second, even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not always escalate to open warfare and state collapse. While interpersonal violence is more or less common and may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and population pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions. Both of these studies emphasize the role of local dispute-resolution regimes and institutions – not just the response of central governments – in preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martin’s analysis also points to the importance of international organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps. Therefore, local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be

**Can’t solve Cuban sugar ethanol.**

**Sanchez ‘11**

Adriana E. Sanchez, NotiEn, News Agency, 2011, “Biofuels Fighting for Space in Central America and Cuba,” http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/12797/Biofuels%20Fighting%20for%20Space%20in%20Central%20America%20and%20Cuba.pdf?sequence=1

Similar to Central America, Cuba’s potential to become a leader in biofuel production is subject to speculation, and it will be strongly tied to the energy policy that the island adopts within the next few years. The Association for the Study of Cuban Economy (ASCE) says sugarcane could seemingly provide the raw material for biofuel production. But tight supplies might be a problem. The island nation is expected to produce only 1.2 million tons of raw sugar. This is a very small amount when compared to sugar production in the 1990s, which was estimated to reach 7 million to 8 million tons per year. With its current sugarcane output, Cuba could produce an estimated 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year, energy industry sources say. ¶ In an interview with NotiEn, Jorge Piñón, a well-known expert on Cuban energy policy, suggested that Cuba would have to stop its dependence on fossil fuels from foreign countries if it is to develop energy independence. "Cuba passed from papa Russia to papa Venezuela to solve its population’s energy demand," said Piñón. "Cuba must strive to start working on an energy policy that can help the country independent of who is in power." ¶ Piñón said ethanol production has not been more actively promoted because of the complicated relation that Cuba has had with sugarcane. "Fidel Castro puts his foot down every time there are talks about an increase in ethanol production; for him it is a political issue," said Piñón, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center and an analyst for the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami.

# 2NC

**Accidents result in extinction**.

**Toon ‘7** (Owen B, chair – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences – Colorado University, climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

**Large untapped reserves in Cuba**

**Sadowski ‘11**

Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp

A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba’s offshore¶ oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable¶ oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas.29 Cupet, the¶ state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves¶ are double that of the U.S. estimate.30 One estimate indicates¶ that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day.31¶ Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil¶ exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India.32¶ Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure¶ for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies¶ are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves.33¶ Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S.¶ investment and technology.34 Finally, the concern over Cuban¶ offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure¶ and harms human rights.

**Old studies wrong – large untapped reserves exist.**

**Schenk ‘10**

Christopher J. Schenk is Project Chief of the U.S. National Oil and Gas Assessment – ¶ GEOLOGIC ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS RESOURCES OF THE NORTH CUBA BASIN, CUBA – http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1029/pdf/OF10-1029.pdf

The potential for undiscovered petroleum resources of the North Cuba Basin historically has focused on the heavy oil fields of the onshore fold and thrust belt (Echevarria-Rodriguez and others, 1991; Pindell, 1991; Petzet, 2000; Oil and Gas Journal, 1993, 2000, 2002,¶ 2005), but recent efforts have focused **on the offshore potential** (fig.7) (Vassalli and others,¶ 2003; Moretti and others, 2003a,b; Magnier and others, 2004). This study indicates that the offshore of the North Cuba Basin **might have significant potential for undiscovered oil and gas resources** (Schenk, 2008).

**Saudi Arabia fears the narrative that the US may abandon them for North American supplies.**

**Rogers 3/20**

[2013 – Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). At CNAS, Mr. Rogers’ research focus is on science, technology and national security policy. He has authored or co-authored a range of publications on energy, climate change, environmental cooperation in Asia and cybersecurity, “America Committed to Gulf Security Despite Changing Relationship with Region's Oil, says Gen. Dempsey,” Center for New American Security, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2013/03/america-committed-gulf-security-despite-changing-relationship-regions-]

America’s relationship with the Middle East’s energy resources is changing as U.S. domestic oil production continues to grow. A combination of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling and advanced seismic technologies have contributed to the largest annual growth in U.S. crude oil production since Colonel Edwin Drake first drilled for oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. Most of the crude oil is coming from shale formations in North Dakota and Texas – what we call “light tight oil.” Since 2010, the United States has, on average, increased monthly crude oil production by 50,000 barrels a day.¶ Not all of this U.S. light tight oil is displacing Middle East crude, of course. A number of factors matter, most importantly the crude oil grade. The United States is producing light tight oil, that is, **low-density crude oil**, whereas the United States imports heavier crudes from the Persian Gulf, including from **Saudi Arabia**. Moreover, U.S. refineries have been increasingly geared to absorb heavier crudes, from the Persian Gulf, but more so from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela.¶ Nevertheless, the glut in U.S. crude oil production and declining demand for oil (a consequence of slow economic growth and more fuel efficient vehicles) have contributed to a powerful notion that the United States is relying less and less on oil from the Persian Gulf and could conceivably help wean America off crude oil imports from the Middle East entirely (a debatable point).¶ Whether or not one believes that the United States can break the tether to Middle East oil, U.S. allies and **partners in the Persian Gulf are increasingly nervous about America’s long-term security commitment to the region**. After all, **if the U**nited **S**tates **no longer relies on energy from the region,** why should American foot the bill for protecting the sea lanes – that backbone of the crude oil trade in the region – **or so the narrative goes**.¶ The United States has a number of stakes in stability of the Persian Gulf oil trade even if it does rely less on oil from the region. Supply shocks will contribute to higher global oil prices, which will be felt at home. Moreover, supply shocks are damaging to our allies, particularly those in East Asia that have grown more dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa. But there are other legitimate security concerns as well, which were not far from General Martin Dempsey’s mind when he responded to a question on Monday about how the American energy revolution will impact U.S. interests and presence in the Persian Gulf. Here’s what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said:If by 2017 the United States can achieve some level of energy independence, why in the world would we continue to be concerned about the energy that flows out of – out of the Gulf? Well, look, my answer to that is I didn’t go to the Gulf in 1991 and stay there for about the next 20 years because of oil. That’s not why I went. It’s not why my children went. It’s –and we went there because we thought that a region of the world where we had – where we had not, except for a few bilateral relationships – where we hadn’t invested much of our, let’s call it, bandwidth, intellectual energy, commitment – now, we went there in ’91 because of the – of the aggression of Saddam Hussein, but we stayed there because I think we came to the realization that the future of the region was tied to our future, and not through this thing called oil but rather through the – as I said earlier, the shared interest in a common future where people would be able to build a better life and where threats could be managed collaboratively, not by the United States uniquely but by the relationships we would build on the basis of common interests. So when I hear about in 2017, you know, oil won’t be as big a factor for us – and that’s great. I hope we do achieve energy independence. But I can assure you that at least from a military perspective – and I can only speak, as I dress, from the military perspective – that the continued development of capabilities – military capabilities, notably, in my world, but also partnerships and trust that we build by working together, by exchanging officers and noncommissioned officers in our professional military schools, that on that basis, you will find –you will find that the future will be a period of greater commitment.¶ Now, you know, if you measure our commitment in terms of numbers of boots on the ground and numbers of aircraft and number of aircraft carriers, I think you’ll probably –you know, there’ll always be this debate about inclining or declining commitment. But that’s not what the commitment’s all about, really, in my view. As I said, I went to – I went to the Gulf in ’91, spent almost the next 20 years there on and off and didn’t do it for oil.¶ So we have two powerful strategic cross-currents that the Obama administration will have to confront in the near term.¶ This week marks the anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a solemn reminder for some that the United States should be less engaged in the Middle East, not more. Add this to the notion that the United States could break the tether to Middle East oil, **and the** domestic **narrative speaks for itself**. At the same time, though, a credible U.S. security commitment to our partners in the Persian Gulf may be the only way to allay concerns about security challenges in the region. Take for example, Iran. My colleagues Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton and Matt Irvine recently published a report assessing the possibility that an Iranian bomb could lead to Saudi Arabia developing the bomb – Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia be Next? Kahl, Dalton and Irvine argue quite persuasively that a number of factors will keep Saudi Arabia from developing the bomb. But one of the big caveats to this is a credible U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Does the Royal Family in Riyadh feel comfortable about this commitment given the competing narrative that America may have an opportunity to walk away from the Persian Gulf if it doesn’t need access to the region’s oil? The public **perception on these issues - at home and abroad - will**

**their evidence is from 2008 – Lippmann concludes 3 years later that perceived breakdown of relations causes prolif.**

**Lippman ’11** (Sr. Adjunct Scholar-Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.susris.com/2011/08/05/saudi-arabia’s-nuclear-policy-lippman/)

So let us suppose that Saudi Arabia’s currently testy relationship with the United States deteriorated to the point where the Saudis no longer *felt* they could rely on Washington’s protection. If the Saudis could no longer assume that the armed forces of the United States are their ultimate weapon against external threats, might they not wish to acquire a different ultimate weapon? With that in mind, could not a reasonable case be made in the Saudis’ minds for the development of an alternative security relationship, and perhaps a nuclear agreement, with another major power should relations with the United States deteriorate? A possible candidate for such a role would of course be China, a nuclear power that has a close relationship with Saudi Arabia’s ally Pakistan and a growing need for imported oil. Sufficiently remote from the Gulf not to pose a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, and no longer part of any international communist movement, China could theoretically be an attractive partner. This is not to say that Saudi Arabia is actually seeking such a relationship with any country other the United States, or that China would undertake such a mission, but to be unaware of any such outreach is not to exclude it from the realm of possibility. THE STRATEGY GAP The Saudi Arabian armed forces have never developed a coherent national security doctrine that could provide a serious basis for a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. But to summarize the reasons why Saudi Arabia might pursue such a course: it is a rich but weak country with armed forces of suspect competence; outmanned by combat-hardened, truculent and potentially nuclear-armed neighbors; and no longer confident that it can count on its American protector. Even before the Iraq War, Richard L. Russell of the National Defense University argued in a 2001 essay arguing the case for Saudi acquisition of nuclear capability that “It would be imprudent, to say the least, for Riyadh to make the cornerstone of [its] national-security posture out of an assumption that the United States would come to the kingdom’s defense under any and all circumstances.” It might be even more imprudent now. “From Riyadh’s perspective,” continued Russell, “the acquisition of nuclear weapons and secure delivery systems would appear logical and even necessary.” Those “secure delivery systems,” Russell argued, would not be aircraft, which are vulnerable to ground defenses, but “ballistic-missile delivery systems that would stand a near-invulnerable chance of penetrating enemy airspace” — namely, the CSS-2s. Military experts say it is theoretically possible that the missiles could be made operational, modernized, and retrofitted with nuclear warheads acquired from China, Pakistan or perhaps, within a few years, North Korea. Any attempt to do so, however, would present immense technical and political difficulties — so much so that Saudi Arabia might emerge less secure, rather than more.

**Lack of oil relations causes rapid prolif**

**Black ‘9**

(Major Chris, master’s program at the Joint Forces Staff College, “Post Oil America and a renewable energy policy leads to the abrogation of the Middle East to China.,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA530125&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

All of these factors have slowly led to Saudi Arabia wanting to assume a more independent role in its own security.181 In 2007, Saudi Arabia brokered a deal between Fatah and Hamas and hosted an Arab League Summit which they had declined to attend the two previous years. Also in 2007, King Abdullah also hosted Iran’s President Ahmadinejad and canceled a state dinner with President Bush.182 Recently Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faial warned Iran on two separate occasions to stop meddling in inter-Arab affairs and has urged Arabs to unify clearly concerned with Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.183 Additionally, this has brought about a renewed emphasis by the Saudis to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads which is a major concern by the US.184 Saudi Arabia is now flexing their muscle in the Middle East and has taken an increasing role in managing their own affairs. This scenario could lead to either cooperation or competition between the US and China in the region. Further, in this scenario, **Saudi Arabia will increasingly align with the countries who are buying their oil**. A geopolitical shift will begin with the rise of China in the Persian Gulf region secondary to a diminishing American presence, **which will intensify Saudi Arabian concerns for their security.**

**Domestic politics block a reorientation in the US’ strategy.**

**Grandin 10** – teaches history at New York University and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Greg, “Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” *New Labor Forum*, 19:1, Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//SJF

It’s not going to happen. Efforts to implement any one of the above policy changes would be **blocked by** powerful **domestic interests**. Take biofuels. The idea to liberalize the U.S. agricultural market—and have the rhetoric of free trade somewhat match the reality—is recommended by all mainstream think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, as an important step to win back Brazil. Obama recognizes the importance of Brazil, having nominated George W. Bush’s outgoing assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Shannon—respected in establishment circles as, according to the journal Foreign Policy, “the most talented and successful individual” to serve as Washington’s envoy to Latin America “in at least two decades”—as its ambassador. Yet Shannon’s confirmation had been threatened by Senator Chuck Grassley, representing the agro-industry state of Iowa, who objected to the then-nominee’s comment during his confirma- tion hearings that removing a fifty-four-cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol would be good for U.S. foreign policy. The White House immediately declared that it had no plans to change tariff policy, and Grassley allowed the confirmation to proceed.5 The White House’s quick buckling probably has to do with its fruitless attempt to win over Grassley for health care reform, a further indicator of how **foreign policy is held hostage by domestic politics**. Similar obstacles stand in the way of other foreign policy reforms. The Cuban lobby, along with the broader conservative Right, prevents a normalization of relations with Havana. Fear of the National Rifle Association halts a renewal of the assault weapons ban. As to the “War on Drugs,” the Democratic Party is deeply committed to “Plan Colombia,” the centerpiece of that war. It is, after all, a legacy of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, and much of the $6 billion spent to fight it thus far goes directly into the coffers of corporate sponsors of the Democratic Party like Connecticut’s United Technologies and other northeastern defense contractors (it was Bill Clinton who in 1997, acting on behalf of Lockheed Martin, lifted a twenty-year ban on high-tech weapons sales to Latin America, kicking off an arms build-up, in which Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have taken the lead).6 As to immigration reform—also recom- mended by influential establishment groups to improve U.S. standing in Latin America— Obama, in Mexico, said it would have to wait until next year. He has a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a large majority in the House, yet he says there aren’t enough votes and “there is not, by any means, con- sensus across the table.”7 Obama could easily assemble a majority coalition on this issue—comprised of business interests who want cheap labor, Hispanics, progressives, social justice Catholics, and members of the labor movement (who long ago signaled their support for immigration reform)—yet fear of a backlash fueled by a contracting economy has led him to back- burner the issue. The same conditions that make Latin America the best venue in which to modernize U.S. diplomacy—namely that there is no immediate threat emerging from the region, no equivalent of North Korea or Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, no insurgency bogging down U.S. troops as in Afghanistan, and no conflict threatening access to vital resources (Washington’s main antagonist in the region, Venezuela, continues to sell most of its oil to the U.S.)—also mean that there are no real incentives for Obama’s fledgling foreign policy coalition to expend political capital on trying to improve policy there. Analysts of the American empire—from Charles A. Beard in the 1930s to William Appleman Williams in the 1960s and 1970s— have emphasized the U.S.’s unique ability to subsume competing economic, ideological, and sectional interests into a flexible and vital diplomacy in defense of a general “national interest,” which has led America to unprec- edented global power.8 Yet now—confronted with a sustained economic contraction, the fallout from a disastrous overleveraging of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a post-Cold War, post-neoliberal world with multiple power centers—expansion has given way to involution. **The** U.S. **political system seems to be** literally **devouring itself from within, paralyzing the ability of foreign policymakers to adjust** to a rapidly changing world. Unable to leverage its soft, smart power even in its own hemisphere, Washington is ever more dependent on the military and corporate mercenary forces that have transformed Colombia into a citadel of U.S. hard power in the Andes.

**No try or die framing -- no transition coming.**

**Kagan, 12** [Robert, 1-5, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe -- Brookings, “New Year, Old Foreign Policy Problems,” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0105\_international\_relations\_kagan]

Meanwhile, the much-discussed “rise of the rest” has been overhyped. U.S. business leaders, and their pals in the punditocracy, have been mesmerized by these emerging markets. But emerging markets do not equate to emerging great powers. Russia is no longer “rising.” Brazil’s role in the world is underwhelming. Turkey’s impact has yet to be demonstrated. India has not decided what it wants to be. Even China, though unquestionably a major player, has not yet taken on a great power’s role. For the United States, Europe remains the key ally in shoring up the norms and principles of a liberal world order. Should Europe fall, the blow to U.S. interests would be staggering. America matters: Reports of U.S. decline are extraordinarily premature. **The country remains the central player in all regions of the world.** Washington may not be able to have its way on all issues or provide solutions for all the world’s problems. But, then, it never could. Many today have nostalgia for an era of U.S. predominance that never existed. But in the coming months, whether the issue is Iran, Syria or Asian security, regional players will continue to look to the United States. No other nation or group of nations comes close to enjoying America’s global web of alliances. None wields more political influence in international forums. And unless and until the United States renders itself weak by unnecessary defense budget cuts, **there will be no substitute for it as a provider of security and defender of an open political and economic order.** Perhaps 2012 will be the year Americans gain a renewed understanding of that enduring reality.

**Extinction outweighs.**

**Nye, 86** (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 45-46)

Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of mass murder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.

**Warming’s inevitable.**

**Mims 12** [cites Will Steffen, executive director of the Australian National University's climate change institute, 3/26/12, Christopher Mims, “Climate scientists: It’s basically too late to stop warming,” http://grist.org/list/climate-scientists-its-basically-too-late-to-stop-warming/]

\*Warming’s inevitable – Mims cites 3 reasons –

1. Ice Sheets – the West Antarctic ice sheet and Greenland ice sheets have melted so much that natural climate feedbacks sent us past the tipping point.

2. Natural gas – engineers are harvesting it from the bottom of the ocean which drastically increases carbon emissions – their climate models don’t account for this.

3. China – it’s the largest carbon emitter but refuses to hamper economic growth to reduce emissions – even if the US cuts its emissions, other countries won’t because of coal needs.

If you like cool weather and not having to club your neighbors as you battle for scarce resources, now’s the time to move to Canada, because the story of the 21st century is almost written, reports Reuters. Global warming is close to being irreversible, and in some cases that ship has already sailed. Scientists have been saying for a while that we have until between 2015 and 2020 to start radically reducing our carbon emissions, and what do you know: That deadline’s almost past! Crazy how these things sneak up on you while you’re squabbling about whether global warming is a religion. Also, our science got better in the meantime, so now we know that no matter what we do, we can say adios to the planet’s ice caps. For ice sheets — huge refrigerators that slow down the warming of the planet — **the tipping point has** probably already been **passed**, Steffen said. The West Antarctic ice sheet has shrunk over the last decade and the Greenland ice sheet has lost around 200 cubic km (48 cubic miles) a year since the 1990s. Here’s what happens next: Natural climate feedbacks will take over and, on top of our prodigious human-caused carbon emissions, send us over an irreversible tipping point. By 2100, the planet will be hotter than it’s been since the time of the dinosaurs, and everyone who lives in red states will pretty much get the apocalypse they’ve been hoping for. The subtropics will expand northward, the bottom half of the U.S. will turn into an inhospitable desert, and everyone who lives there will be drinking recycled pee and struggling to salvage something from an economy wrecked by the destruction of agriculture, industry, and electrical power production. Water shortages, rapidly rising seas, superstorms swamping hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure: It’s all a-coming, and anyone who is aware of the political realities knows that the odds are slim that our government will move in time to do anything to avert the biggest and most avoidable disaster short of all-out nuclear war. Even if our government did act, we can’t control the emissions of the developing world.